

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 GENEVA 12479 01 OF 02 151935Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
INRE-00 ACDE-00 /026 W
-----100250 151941Z /50
P 151914Z AUG 78
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3219
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USNATO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 12479

EXDIS

USSALTTWO

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: COMMENTS ON PLENARY, AUGUST 15, 1978
(SALT TWO - 1841)

REFS: A. SALTTWO - 1840 B. SALTTWO - 1842
C. SALTTWO - 1843 D. SALTTWO - 1779 E. STATE 203721

1. AT DRAFTING GROUP MEETING PRIOR TO PLENARY, SIDES EXCHANGED REVISED JDT PAGE 15 AND PAGES 2 AND 3 OF THE JOINT STATEMENT, INCORPORATING AGREED CHANGES REACHED AT YESTERDAY'S CONFORMING SUBGROUP MEETING (REF A).
2. AT PLENARY, MY STATEMENT (REF B) ON DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION OF EXCESS STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS POINTED OUT LACK OF SOVIET PROPOSALS ON STEADY RATE AND ASSURED INOPERABILITY, AND ABSENCE OF EXPLANATION FOR DELAY IN INITIATION OF REDUCTIONS TO THE 2250 LEVEL.
3. SEMENOV'S STATEMENT (REF C) REVIEWED SOVIET POSITION
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 GENEVA 12479 01 OF 02 151935Z

ON JOINT STATEMENT AND REAFFIRMED SOVIET PROPOSALS CURRENTLY BRACKETED.

4. AT POST-PLENARY I GAVE SEMENOV US-PROPOSED FORMAT ON DATA BASE (REFS D AND E) EXPLAINING THAT IT WAS FORMAL US PROPOSAL AND WOULD BE TABLED AT PLENARY PROMPTLY AFTER RECESS. SEMENOV SAID HE WOULD REPORT PROPOSAL AND STUDY

IT, AND REAFFIRMED SOVIET OPPOSITION TO HEAVY ICBM LAUNCHER CATEGORY. SEMENOV ALSO REVIEWED SOVIET POSITIONS RE CMCS AND AGAIN ASKED ABOUT (A) ODS FOR B-52S AND (B) POSSIBLE CM COMPATIBILITY IN FUTURE WITH EXISTING SRAM RACKS. HE ADDED THAT US PRESS HAD REPORTED LONG-RANGE CM LAUNCHINGS FROM B-52 SRAM LAUNCHERS.

5. HIGHLIGHTS OF OTHER POST-PLENARY CONVERSATIONS:

ROWNY/BELETSKY-STARODUBOV. BELETSKY SAID US IS ATTEMPTING TO AVOID AGREEMENTS ON CRUISE MISSILES REACHED AT HIGHER LEVELS AND CHARACTERIZED THIS AS AN ATTEMPT TO CIRCUMVENT THE AGREEMENT. HE ALSO ARGUED FOR FUTURE REDUCTIONS OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS AS THE BEST WAY TO LIMIT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

KWIECIAK/JOURAVLEV-KOUKLEV. KWIECIAK ASKED FOR AN EXPLANATION OF SOVIET PHRASE "SPECIALLY BUILT" IN CONTEXT OF WHETHER OR NOT A SIDE COULD EQUIP AN AIRPLANE OF SAME BASIC AIRFRAME AS A TRANSPORT AIRPLANE WITH CRUISE MISSILES. KOUKLEV RESPONDED THAT QUESTION IS RELATED TO ISSUE OF THE NUMBER OF CRUISE MISSILES ON AN AIRPLANE AND MUST BE RESOLVED IN THIS CONTEXT. HE SAID THAT ASSUMING AN AGREED LIMIT OF 20 CRUISE MISSILES, BUILDING A CMC USING A 747 AIRFRAME WOULD RAISE "SUSPICIONS." JOURAVLEV SAID THAT IN CASE OF A 747 AIRFRAME, NOT ONLY WOULD FRODS
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 GENEVA 12479 01 OF 02 151935Z

BE REQUIRED TO INDICATE A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SUCH A CMC AND 747 TRANSPORTS, BUT "FRODS" WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ENSURE THAT AIRCRAFT IS ONLY CAPABLE OF BEING EQUIPPED FOR 20 CRUISE MISSILES.

CHAPUT/PAVLICHENKO. IN CONTEXT OF DISCUSSION OF POTENTIAL OBSTACLES TO RATIFICATION, PAVLICHENKO DENIED THAT THERE HAD BEEN ANY INCONSISTENCY IN SOVIET BACKFIRE PERFORMANCE CLAIMS. CHAPUT NOTED THAT SAME RADIUS FIGURE RECENTLY HAD BEEN GIVEN FOR ALL SUBSONIC MISSION WHICH HAD BEEN GIVEN IN 1976 FOR MISSION WHICH INCLUDED BOTH SUBSONIC AND SUPERSONIC FLIGHT. PAVLICHENKO DENIED THAT 1976 CLAIM (BREZHNEV TO KISSINGER) HAD BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH ANY SPECIFIC MISSION PROFILE.

OKUN-MCNEILL-RAMEE-STRANG/SMOLIN-OBUKHOV. OKUN SAID US DOES NOT UNDERSTAND PERSISTENT SOVIET QUESTIONS RE CRUISE MISSILES ON SRAM ROTARY LAUNCHERS, AND INDICATED US BELIEF THAT TREATY PROVISIONS COVER ALL HYPOTHETICAL CASES. SMOLIN REPEATED PREVIOUS QUESTION AND ALSO RAISED CONCERN REGARDING COMPATIBILITY OF CMS IN FUTURE DESIGNED FOR ANOTHER AIRCRAFT BUT COMPATIBLE WITH B-52 SRAM LAUNCHERS. IN DISCUSSION OF TERMS "MODERNIZATION" AND "MODIFICATION"

IN 5TH COMMON UNDERSTANDING TO ARTICLE II.5 SOVIETS INDICATED THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCE.

KANGAS/SHCHUKIN. IN DISCUSSION OF "ALL RELEVANT FACTORS" SHCHUKIN REITERATED SOVIET DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC ARMS AS THOSE THAT CAN STRIKE THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE. SHCHUKIN SAID THAT FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE BASED ON UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES THAT A) NUCLEAR WAR IS IMPOSSIBLE; AND B) MUTUAL TRUST WAS NECESSARY TO CREATE A STABLE

SECRET

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PAGE 01 GENEVA 12479 02 OF 02 160251Z
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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 GENEVA 12479

EXDIS

USSALTTWO

SITUATION IN WHICH POSSIBLE TERRORIST ACTS (NUCLEAR) COULD BE CONSIDERED BY BOTH SIDES WITH "COOL HEADS." HE THEN CRITICIZED US INACTION AND LISTED THE FOLLOWING "LESSER ISSUES" WHICH SHOULD BE RESOLVED QUICKLY:

-- DISMANTLING AND DESTRUCTION (SUPPORTING SOVIET POSITION BUT HINTING THAT SOVIETS MIGHT SOON PRESENT "ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS");

-- ADVANCE NOTIFICATION (DEFENDING SOVIET POSITION ON SINGLE LAUNCHES FROM DEPLOYMENT AREAS BUT HINTING THAT DEFINITION OF MULTIPLE LAUNCHES COULD BE DISCUSSED IN CONNECTION WITH THE "OVERSTATED" TIME INTERVAL PROPOSED BY THE US).

SHCHUKIN SHOWED NO FLEXIBILITY ON 20 CM LIMIT, REITERATED
ITS LINKAGE TO MISSILE FRACTIONATION LIMITS, AND EXPRESSED
SOVIET CONCERN RE B-52 SRAM LAUNCHERS.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 GENEVA 12479 02 OF 02 160251Z

6. NEXT PLENARY TO BE ARRANGED AT HEADS OF DELEGATION
MEETING SEPTEMBER 7. EARLE

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Message Attributes

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